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A RECENT ARTICLE in the American Journal of Interna-
tional Law ("AJIL") on application of the Precautionary
Principle to Antarctica' engenders the idea that the Precaution-
ary Principle could be applied usefully to activities on the Moon.
The Precautionary Principle has been codified in several inter-
national agreements on the protection of natural resources. As
expressed in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio de Janeiro
Declaration:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.2
* The author teaches air law and space law at Georgetown University Law
Center, 600 New Jersey Ave. NW, Washington D.C., 20001. E-mail:
PBLSpace@aol.com. This comment was presented at the World Space Congress
in Fukuoka,,Japan, Oct. 17-21, 2005. The author acknowledges, with gratitude,
helpful guidance received from Professor Robert V. Percival, Director,
Environmental Programs, and Robert Stanton, Scholar, University of Maryland
School of Law, from Professor Francis Lyall, University of Aberdeen Faculty of
Law, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, and from Visiting Professor Bernhard
Schloh, University of Pittsburgh Law School. Only the author is responsible for
the views expressed herein.
I Kees Bastmeijer & Ricardo Roura, Regulating Antarctic Tourism and the Precau-
tionary Principle, 98 A i. J. INT'. L. 763 (2004) [hereinafter Bastmeijer & Roura].
2 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992). See, e.g., Convention for the Conserva-
tion of Antarctic Seals, june 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441; Convention on the Regula-
tion of Antarctic Mineral Res. Activities, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 (this
Convention is not in force). See aLo Treaty Establishing the European Commiu-
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According to the Precautionary Principle,' States and their
nationals conducting activities relating to natural resources
must use extra caution when the result or outcome of the activ-
ity is uncertain. The Principle is particularly relevant to fragile
environments.4 The two authors of the AJIL article, Bastmeijer
and Roura, observe that the Principle deals more with managing
uncertain risks than with preventing known risks. They con-
clude that the Precautionary Principle applies to Antarctica.5
nity, art. 174(2), Mar. 25, 1957, 2002 O.J. (C. 325), available at http://
www.europa.eu.int./eur-lex [hereinafter European Community Treaty]:
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of
protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the vari-
ous regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary
principle, and on the principles that preventive action should be
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified
at source and that the polluter should pay.
(emphasis added). The Commission of the European Communities, Communication
from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 4, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2,
2000) [hereinafter Commission of the European Communities Communication],
explains: [M]easures based on the precautionary principle should be, inter alia:
* proportional to the chosen level of protection,
• non-discriminatory in their application,
• consistent with similar measures already taken,
* based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs of action or
lack of action (including, where appropriate and feasible, an eco-
nomic cost/benefit analysis),
* subject to review, in the light of new scientific data, and
* capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence
necessary for a more comprehensive risk assessment.
3 Professor Robert V. Percival, Director of Environmental Programs at the Uni-
versity of Maryland, has researched the Precautionary Principle from a United
States point of view; see Robert V. Percival, Who's Afraid of the Precautionary Princi-
ple, 23 PACE ENVmL. L. Rv. 801 (2006). Professor Percival finds four main ele-
ments of the Precautionary Principle: a serious threat of irreversible damage;
uncertainty about the impact of planned activities on the environment; the scope
of the authority of the regulator; and the regulator's use of that authority. Wybe
Th. Douma, The Precautionary Principle in the European Union, 9 REv. EUR. CM-m. &
ENVrL. L., 132, 132 (2000), states that the Precautionary Principle applies when it
is "unclear whether damage will occur at all or what causes existing damage." It
applies when "risks are not quantifiable and can be referred to as potential risks."
Id.
4 Bastmeijer & Roura, supra note 1, at 772.
5 Id.
PRECA UTIONAR Y PRINCIPLE
Antarctica is subject to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which has
been universally accepted.6 The Antarctic Treaty demilitarized
Antarctica and made it into terra communis.7
The objective of this article is to examine whether the Precau-
tionary Principle can also be applied to the Moon because the
Antarctic Treaty' is closely linked to and served as the model for
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty ("OST"). 9 The Antarctica analogy
was most forcefully made by United States President Eisenhower
in his famous 1960 address to the United Nations General As-
sembly. He said:
The nations of the world have recently united in declaring the
continent of Antarctica "off limits" to military preparations. We
could extend this principle to an even more important sphere.
National vested interests have not yet developed in space or in
celestial bodies. Barriers to agreement are now lower than they
will ever be again.1
President Eisenhower then proposed that, like Antarctica,
outer space should not be subject to a claim of sovereignty, and
that nations should not engage in warlike activities in outer
space and on celestial bodies. 1 Like the Antarctic Treaty, the
OST demilitarized the Moon and made the Moon terra com-
munis.12 The Moon is "the province of all mankind" and "not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty."' Ab
initio, it is notably the lack of right of national appropriation
that weakens the absolute right of individual States to engage in
lunar activities. In particular, lack of this right undermines the
right to do anything in fragile areas because it may preclude
other States from ever using those areas.
6 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter
Antarctic Treaty]. Forty-seven States are parties to the Treaty. The Antarctic
Treaty system includes the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty which entered into force in 1998. Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455.
7 Common territory to which sovereignty cannot be acquired. See PI-iLLiP C.
JESSUP & HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE
ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 181 (1959).
8 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6.
9 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address to the General Assembly, S. Doc. No. 26, at
1009 (1st Sess. 1961) [hereinafter Eisenhower Address].
I d.
12 OST, supra note 9, at art. IV.
13 Id. arts. 1, 11.
2006] 297
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
II. REASONS FOR INVOKING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE TO THE MOON
The reasoning behind application of the Precautionary Prin-
ciple to Antarctica is that Antarctica is a fragile environment. 4
The Moon is possibly more fragile than Antarctica. All astro-
nauts agree that outer space, including the Moon, is a very dan-
gerous and unforgiving place that does not permit any mistakes
to be made. Its fragile environment makes the outcome of lu-
nar activities uncertain. It is particularly important to focus on
uncertainties in making decisions about the Moon's environ-
ment because erroneous decisions about the Moon cannot be
reversed. The Moon's fragility becomes an urgent question be-
cause several States plan exploration. For example, NASA's
plans for moon exploration include the objective of permanent
habitation; China and possibly India have new interest in Moon
exploration; the European Space Agency ("ESA") plans lunar
activities; private companies plan use of the Moon's minerals;
and other private uses, such as manufacture and tourism on the
Moon, are planned. 5 But the Moon is fragile: nothing grows on
the Moon; it has no air; it is unable to "heal" itself after impact;
craters from ancient asteroid strikes remain; and the footprints
of the visiting United States astronauts will remain on the sur-
face of the moon, unless disturbed by later lunar activity.
III. LEGAL BASIS FOR APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE TO OUTER SPACE
When and where did States agree on application of the Pre-
cautionary Principle to the environment of the Moon? Nowhere
in the space law treaties is application of the Precautionary Prin-
ciple to the Moon expressly mentioned. However, the Antarctic
Treaty System does not expressly adopt the Precautionary Princi-
ple either. 6 Legal authority for application of the Precaution-
14 See Bastmeijer & Roura, supra note 1, at 772.
15 Paul B. Larsen, Current Legal Issues Pertaining to Space Solar Power Systems, 16
SPACE POL' 139, 139-144 (2000). The United States' "vision" for economic devel-
opment of the Moon was restated in a keynote address by White House Science
Advisor, Dr. John Marburger, at the 44th Robert H. Goddard Symposium on
March 15, 2006. Russia also plans economic development of the Moon. See Craig
Cowalt, Russia's Lunar Return, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 5, 2006, at 20.
16 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6. Lluis Paradell-Trius, Principles ofInterna-
tional Environmental Law: an Overview, 9 REV. EUR. CMT'. & ENV'T L. 93, 94 (2000)
states that principles of international environmental law, such as the Precaution-
ary Principle, are often drawn from many sources, in particular from soft law.
298
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ary Principle to Antarctica is scholarly legal opinion that the
Precautionary Principle can be read into the Antarctic Treaty
System because the treaty system implicitly describes and incor-
porates the Principle. The two authors of the AJIL article,
Bastmeijer and Roura, first ascertain that the Antarctic Treaty is
accepted by all interested parties. 7 The treaty parties meet reg-
ularly in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings to imple-
ment the treaty system. Furthermbre, "[a]pplication of the
[precautionary] principle would be consistent with the proac-
tive approach of the Antarctic Treaty System."'"t
A. PROTECTION OF FRAGILE LUNAR RESOURCES
If application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon is
linked to the fragility of the lunar environment, then we search
for OST treaty provisions requiring caution in the use of the
Moon's resources. General acceptance of the need to use cau-
tion is generally expressed in OST article V, which requires
States to inform the United Nations of "any phenomena they
discover in outer space, including the Moon and celestial bod-
ies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astro-
nauts." General acceptance of the need to use caution is also
expressed in OST article IX, in which contracting States agree to
"avoid harmful contamination" of the Moon.'" Prospective
harmful activities give States Parties the right to appropriate in-
ternational consultations before beginning such activities as
follows:
[A] State Party to the Treaty [that] has reason to believe that an
activity or experiment planned by [another Party] in outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause po-
tentially harmful interference with activities . . . in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, [may request consultation concerning the
activity or experiment]."'
17 Bastmeijer & Roura, supfra note 1, at 768.
18 Id. at 772.
19 Manfred Hintz, Environmental Aspects of Settlement on the Moon and Mars-
Planetary Protection, 34 INT'L INST. SPACE L. 59, 61 (1991). Hintz questions the
scope of harmful contamination, asking: "Does any change in the Moon's envi-
ronment constitute harmful contamination or must it offend other states?" He
assumes that the Treaty permits contamination below the level of harming the
interests of other States. Id.
20 OST, supra note 9, at art. IX.
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Strict control by the States Parties to the OST of national ac-
tivities on the Moon in OST article VI is another indication that
the OST recognizes the fragility of the Moon. 21 States "bear in-
ternational responsibility for national activities in outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies. '22 Other indica-
tions include OST article VII on liability for damages, article IX
on state jurisdiction and control ever their spacecraft, the Liabil-
ity Convention, 23 and the Registration Convention. 24 The Aid to
Astronauts Convention 25 is also relevant to this discussion. It
was negotiated a year before the United States landed on the
Moon in 1969. The United States and the Soviet Union were in
a race to land on the Moon. Both were concerned about the
uncertain dangers facing astronauts and cosmonauts on the
Moon. In this treaty, they agreed on a procedure for assistance
in the event that, through some unfortunate event, astronauts
and cosmonauts are stranded on the Moon. The Aid to Astro-
nauts Convention recognized the uncertainty of lunar activities
in 1968.26
While no human beings had been to the Moon when the OST
was drafted, the drafting of the 1979 Moon Treaty27 has the
benefit of the knowledge and experience of astronauts having
faced the uncertainties of existence on and return from the
Moon. The 1979 Moon Treaty specifically provides in Art 7(1):
In exploringand using the Moon, States Parties shall take mea-
sures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its envi-
ronment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that
environment, by its harmful contamination through the intro-
duction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise.28
21 See id. art. IV.
22 Id.
23 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Liability Conven-
tion]. Damage to a space object on the Moon is subject to proof of fault.
24 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
Space objects sent to the Moon must be registered.
25 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672
U.N.T.S. 119.
26 Paul G. Dembling & Daniel Arons, The Treaty on Rescue and Return of Astro-
nauts and Space Objects, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 630 (1968).
27 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, 6.N. Doc. A/34/
46 (1980), 14 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter 1979 Moon Treaty].
28 Id. art. 7(1).
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The 1979 Moon Treaty is particularly clear about the fragility
of the lunar environment. The treaty was negotiated in the
United Nations Committee for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
("COPUOS") 'just prior to 1979 at a time when COPUOS dele-
gates had greater knowledge and greater understanding of the
impact of actual human activities on the Moon. However, the
1979 Moon Treaty is weaker international law than the OST be-
cause the 1979 Moon Treaty, while in force, is not universally
accepted.29 Therefore, its greater significance is as evidence of
the COPUOS delegates' (and thus the world's) awareness of the
fragility of the Moon. The delegates found it necessary to estab-
lish a neutral information bank in the United Nations. ° They
decided to require States to limit their lunar activities as much
as possible" and to keep the United Nations Secretary General
informed.12 They agreed on the need to revisit the issue of an
international regime to govern use of the natural resources of
the Moon. Finally, the delegates felt the need to strengthen the
obligation to demilitarize the Moon. 3
The general admonition against disrupting the existing envi-
ronmental balance of the Moon is underscored by the 1979
Moon Treaty's article 7(3) provision that permits designating ar-
eas of scientific interest worthy of special protective arrange-
ments. 4 Also on point is article 8(1), which states: "States
Parties may pursue their activities in the exploration and use of
the Moon anywhere on or below its surface, subject to the provi-
sions of this Agreement."- The treaty requires the States Parties
to be cautious of disturbing the balance of the environment. It
is possible to construe the application of the Precautionary Prin-
ciple to the Moon based on the combination of the four space
law treaties. Such construction is more difficult if we remove
the 1979 Moon Treaty from consideration. However, it is not a
huge leap from OST article IX's obligation to avoid harmful
contamination of the Moon to the 1979 Moon Treaty's more
29 See id. Neither the United States nor Russia has ratified this treaty.
31 Id. arts. 5, 7. The information office is operated by the United Nations Sec-
retary General through the Office of Outer Space Affairs. Visit http://
www.oosa.unvienna.org for information about that office.
31 See id. art. 9.
32 Id. arts. 5, 7.
33 Id. art. 3.
34 Id. art. 7(3).
'15 Id. art. 8(1).
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specific obligation to prevent disruption of the existing balance
of the Moon's environment.
B. PROTECTION FOR SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION ON THE MOON.
Preservation and facilitation of scientific investigation is an el-
ement of the Precautionary Principle and is also a major pur-
pose of the Antarctic Treaty. That element is clearly indicated
in the Antarctic Treaty's articles II and 111.36 This leads
Bastmeijer and Roura to conclude that application of the Pre-
cautionary Principle to Antarctica would harmonize with Antarc-
tica's dedication to scientific investigation.37  A similar
conclusion may be made about application of the Precautionary
Principle to the Moon and would harmonize with the Moon's
dedication to scientific investigation. The 1967, OST, article I
specifies that "[t] here shall be freedom of scientific investigation
in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
and States shall facilitate and encourage international coopera-
tion in such investigation. "38 In fact, scientific investigation of
outer space is one of the main purposes underlying all the treaty
and United Nations General Assembly declarations concerning
the use of the Moon. 9
C. DUE REGARD FOR INTERESTS OF OTHER STATES.
States Parties agreed in the OST that the Moon and other ce-
lestial bodies "shall be the province of all mankind."4 This prin-
ciple emphasizes that use of the Moon by one individual State or
by a group of States must take into consideration the interests of
other States Parties. This principle is amplified by the 1979
Moon Treaty, article 11, stating: "[t]he Moon and its natural re-
sources are the common heritage of mankind."'" The 1979
Moon Treaty, article 11(5), continues that the States Parties
shall "establish an international regime, including appropriate
3 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6, at arts. II, III.
37 Bastmeijer & Roura, supra note 1, at 772.
38 OST, supra note 9, at art. I.
39 See Eisenhower Address, supra note 10. Note that the Commission of the
European Communities Communication states: "[t] he implementation of an ap-
proach based on the precautionary principle should start with a scientific evalua-
tion, as complete as possible, and where possible, identifying at each stage the
degree of scientific uncertainty." Commission of the European Communities
Communication, supra note 2, at 17.
4o OST, supra note 9, at art. I.
41 1979 Moon Treaty, supra note 27, at art. 11.
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procedures" governing use of the Moon's resources.4  This
means that the Moon continues to be common property, as
stated in the 1967 treaty, but that a detailed regime will be cre-
ated in the future.
In lunar exploration and use, States Parties "shall conduct all
their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of
all other States Parties to the Treaty."4" The obligation to pay
due regard permeates both the OST and the 1979 Moon
Treaty.44 The due regard requirement is consistent with appli-
cation of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon because the
effect of this principle to require individual States to think twice
before using the Moon's resources.45 Thus, States using lunar
resources must consider the interests of other States.
IV. EFFECT OF APPLYING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
What would be the practical effect of applying the Precaution-
ary Principle to the Moon? First of all, it must be emphasized
that the Precautionary Principle differs fundamentally from an
Environmental Impact Assessment. 4 ' The Precautionary Princi-
ple is an acceptance of the uncertainty facing lunar activities
and the need to take this uncertainty into consideration in deci-
sion-making. While the Precautionary Principle is not absolute
and does not prohibit activities on the Moon, it may find certain
risks unacceptable. Application of the Precautionary Principle
may lead to more thorough planning that includes the short
and long-term effects of lunar activities. In the words of
Bastmeijer and Roura:
42 Id. art. 11 (5).
41 OST, supra note 9, at art. IX; see Hintz, supra note 19, at 60.
44 See OST, supra note 9, at art. IX; 1979 Moon Treaty, supra note 27, at arts. 1,
2.
45 See United Kingdom v. Ice., 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25), in which the Interna-
tional Court of Justice held that, on the high seas, States have "the obligation to
pay due regard to the interests of other States in the conservation and equitable
exploitation of these resources." This principle was adopted in UNCLOS, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 56-59.
46 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) [hereinafter
NEPA]. For a discussion of whether NEPA applies to Antarctica, see Envtl. Def.
Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). SeeJennifer A. Purvis, The Long
Arm of the Law? Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Legislation to Human
Activity in Outer Space, 6 GEO. INT'L EN\Fi. L. REV. 455 (providing an excellent
discussion of extraterritorial application of United States environmental laws).
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Generally speaking, a reasonable chance that serious adverse im-
pacts will take place combined with questionable socioeconomic
importance or available alternatives will push the "pointer" to re-
quirements for additional precautionary measures or even to a
"no go" or "not yet" decision.4 7
In Antarctica, the Precautionary Principle leads to improved
evaluation of impact prior to the event rather than after the
event, to prohibitions on activities where characteristics of the
area are unknown, or to establishment of limits on certain kinds
of activities. On the Moon, the Precautionary Principle might
lead to similar consequences. It is clear that in Antarctica, the
Precautionary Principle may be used to regulate tourism in sen-
sitive areas. On the Moon, the Principle could be used for care-
ful planning of manufacturing activities as well as tourism.48
Entrepreneurs Sir Richard Branson and Burt Rutan are now
soliciting reservations and plan to be in business by 2008 - Bran-
son plans to build hotels on the Moon.49 The Precautionary
Principle may also lead to minimum levels of decontamination
and other precautions before sending missions to the Moon.50
V. ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
How would application of the Precautionary Principle to the
Moon be enforced? Enforcement of the States Parties' concerns
with the fragility of the Moon's environment through applica-
tion of the Precautionary Principle would be mainly accom-
plished unilaterally by the States who are responsible for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity
with international law.51 States Parties retain jurisdiction and
control over their spacecraft, including persons onboard while
on a celestial body,52 and States Parties are internationally liable
for damages caused by their spacecraft on the Moon.5 3 Enforce-
ment may also involve the Liability Convention 54 and the Regis-
47 Bastmeijer & Roura, supra note 1, at 773.
48 Fiorini, The Sky's No Limit, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 1, 2005, at 34
(predicting that 100,000 people will visit outer space during the first twelve years
of operation of his spacecraft and that tourism will be the "foundation for human
colonization of space").
49 Id.
50 Hintz, supra note 19, at 61.
51 OST, supra note 9, arts. III, VI.
52 Id. art. VIII.
53 Id. art. VII.
54 Liability Convention, supra note 23, at art. III.
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tration Convention, 5 both of which are meant to identify and
locate spacecraft that may cause damage in outer space.
States receive information about the lunar activities of other
States through an information bank in the United Nations
maintained by the Office of Outer Space Affairs ("OOSA").
States may raise issues of lunar activities during discussions in
COPUOS. They may also request bilateral consultations under
OST article IX. Under the 1979 Moon Treaty article 15, parties
may "seek the assistance of the Secretary General, without seek-
ing the consent of any other State Party concerned, in order to
resolve the controversy. ' 56 States may also ask the International
Court of Justice for enforcement of treaty obligations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In today's early stage of exploration and use, we know very
little about the Moon. States Parties have agreed to proceed
cautiously and jointly, stating that "[t]he exploration and use of
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.
58
Human activities in Antarctica raise more than environmental
issues. They also raise such issues as search and rescue, econ-
omy of the tourist industry, and the politics of differing or irrec-
oncilable claims of sovereignty. The Moon's future is also
multifaceted, involving many kinds of human activities, ranging
from tourism to colonization, mining, and appropriation of
land by means of use or occupation. The space law treaties
55 Registration Convention, supra. note 24, at art. IV.
56 1979 Moon Treaty, supra note 27, at art. 15.
57 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat.
1031, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibcsictext/
ibasicstatute.htm; IRVING SARNOFF, INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THIE UNITED
NATIONS 419 (United Nations 1997). Note that the European Court of Justice
("EC") enforced the European Community Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 174(2)
(the Precautionary Principle). Case C-157/96, Nat'l Farmers' Union, 1998 E.C.R.
1-2211; Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. I -2265. The
Commission had banned export of beef from the U.K. to prevent the risk of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy, and the ECJ sustained, holding that
"[w]here there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human
health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until
the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent." Nat'1 Farmers'
Union, 1998 E.C.R. I - 2211 at 63; United Kingdom, E.C.R. I - 2265 at 99.
5s OST, supra note 9, at art. I.
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clearly did not envision the volume of human activities planned
for the Moon. These increased lunar activities are reason to
consider applying the Precautionary Principle to the Moon
prior to environmental degradation. If the Precautionary Prin-
ciple can be applied to Antarctica, then it can also apply to the
Moon. 5
59 This discussion of Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon
does not consider domestic laws.
